Choose a permission mode

Control whether Claude asks before editing files or running commands. Cycle modes with Shift+Tab in the CLI or use the mode selector in VS Code, Desktop, and claude.ai.

When Claude wants to edit a file, run a shell command, or make a network request, it pauses and asks you to approve the action. Permission modes control how often that pause happens. The mode you pick shapes the flow of a session: Manual mode has you review each action as it comes, while looser modes let Claude work in longer uninterrupted stretches and report back when done. Pick more oversight for sensitive work, or fewer interruptions when you trust the direction.

Available modes

Each mode makes a different tradeoff between convenience and oversight. The table below shows what Claude can do without a permission prompt in each mode.

The mode that reviews every action is named Manual in the CLI, in claude --help, in the VS Code and JetBrains extensions, and in the desktop app. Its config value is default, which is what hooks and SDK integrations use. The CLI accepts manual as an alias wherever you type the value, for example claude --permission-mode manual or "defaultMode": "manual". The Manual label and the manual alias require Claude Code v2.1.200 or later. The desktop app's label doesn't depend on your CLI version.

Writes to protected paths are never auto-approved except in bypassPermissions mode and in planning sessions with bypass permissions available, guarding repository state and Claude's own configuration against accidental corruption.

Modes set the baseline. Layer permission rules on top to pre-approve or block specific tools. These controls apply in every mode, including bypassPermissions:

• deny rules and explicit ask rules, which apply to every tool but can't block EndConversation while any other tool remains
• the org ask setting on connector tools
• the requiresUserInteraction marker

Allow rules have no effect in bypassPermissions because everything else is already approved.

Switch permission modes

You can switch modes mid-session, at startup, or as a persistent default. The mode is set through these controls, not by asking Claude in chat. Select your interface below to see how to change it.

claude --permission-mode plan

{
"permissions": {
"defaultMode": "acceptEdits"
}
}

{
"permissions": {
"defaultMode": "plan"
}
}

claude remote-control --permission-mode acceptEdits

Auto-approve file edits with acceptEdits mode

acceptEdits mode lets Claude create and edit files in your working directory without prompting. The status bar shows ⏵⏵ accept edits on while this mode is active.

In addition to file edits, acceptEdits mode auto-approves common filesystem Bash commands: mkdir, touch, rm, rmdir, mv, cp, and sed. These commands are also auto-approved when prefixed with safe environment variables such as LANG=C or NO_COLOR=1, or process wrappers such as timeout, nice, or nohup. Like file edits, auto-approval applies only to paths inside your working directory or additionalDirectories. Paths outside that scope, writes to protected paths, and all other Bash commands except the built-in read-only set still prompt.

When the PowerShell tool is enabled, acceptEdits mode also auto-approves Set-Content, Add-Content, Clear-Content, and Remove-Item on in-scope paths, along with their common aliases. The same scope and protected-path rules apply.

Use acceptEdits when you want to review changes in your editor or via git diff after the fact rather than approving each edit inline.

Press Shift+Tab once from Manual mode to enter it, or start with it directly:

claude --permission-mode acceptEdits

Analyze before you edit with plan mode

Plan mode tells Claude to research and propose changes without making them. Claude reads files, runs shell commands to explore, and writes a plan, but does not edit your source. Except in sessions with bypass permissions available, edits stay blocked until you approve the plan.

{/* min-version: 2.1.218 */}When auto mode is available and the useAutoModeDuringPlan setting is on, which it is by default, the classifier reviews shell commands during planning instead of prompting you. Approved commands run, and rejected ones are blocked. Otherwise, commands outside the built-in read-only set prompt for approval, including when the sandbox's auto-allow mode is enabled. Sessions with bypass permissions available skip both paths; that section covers what still prompts there. In sessions without them, commands outside the read-only set prompted either way in v2.1.212 through v2.1.217.

Enter plan mode by pressing Shift+Tab or prefixing a single prompt with /plan. You can also start in plan mode from the CLI:

claude --permission-mode plan

Press Shift+Tab again to leave plan mode without approving a plan.

Review and approve a plan

When the plan is ready, Claude presents it and asks how to proceed. From that prompt you can choose:

• Yes, and use auto mode: approve and start in auto mode. When auto mode is unavailable, this option reads Yes, auto-accept edits. Sessions started with bypass permissions enabled show Yes, and bypass permissions instead.
• Yes, manually approve edits: approve and review each edit individually.
• No, refine with Ultraplan on Claude Code on the web: send the plan to Ultraplan for browser-based review.
• No, keep planning: stay in plan mode and tell Claude what to change.

Approving a plan exits plan mode and switches the session to the permission mode each approve option describes, so Claude starts editing. To plan again, cycle back to plan mode with Shift+Tab, or prefix your next prompt with /plan.

Press Ctrl+G to open the proposed plan in your default text editor and edit it directly before Claude proceeds. When showClearContextOnPlanAccept is enabled, the list gains a first option that approves the plan and clears the planning context.

Accepting a plan also names the session from the plan content automatically, unless you've already set a name with --name or /rename.

Set plan mode as the default

To make plan mode the default for a project, set defaultMode in .claude/settings.json:

{
  "permissions": {
    "defaultMode": "plan"
  }
}

Eliminate permission prompts with auto mode

Auto mode lets Claude execute without routine permission prompts. A separate classifier model reviews actions before they run, blocking anything that escalates beyond your request, targets unrecognized infrastructure, or appears driven by hostile content Claude read. Explicit ask rules still force a prompt.

{/* min-version: 2.1.218 */}The classifier also decides removals targeting the filesystem root or home directory, such as rm -rf / and rm -rf ~, including when the removal sits inside command or process substitution. Before v2.1.218, the plain forms prompted for approval instead, and the substitution forms prompted in v2.1.208 through v2.1.217.

Auto mode also nudges Claude to keep working without stopping for clarifying questions, though Claude still asks when your prompt or a skill explicitly relies on it. For stronger autonomous behavior while keeping permission prompts, set the Proactive output style instead.

Auto mode is available only when your account meets all of these requirements:

• Plan: All plans.
• Owner: on Team and Enterprise, an Owner must enable it in Claude Code admin settings before users can turn it on. Administrators can also turn auto mode off by setting permissions.disableAutoMode to "disable" in managed settings. For the desktop app's Code tab, disableAutoMode is the organization-level control, and the admin settings toggle doesn't apply.
• Model: on the Anthropic API and Claude Platform on AWS, Claude Opus 4.6 or later, Sonnet 4.6 or later, or Fable 5. On Amazon Bedrock, Google Cloud's Agent Platform, Microsoft Foundry, and signed-in Claude apps gateway sessions, only Claude Sonnet 5, Opus 4.7 or later, and Fable 5. Older models, including Sonnet 4.5, Opus 4.5, Haiku, and claude-3 models, are not supported on any provider.
• Provider: available by default on the Anthropic API, Claude Platform on AWS, Amazon Bedrock, Google Cloud's Agent Platform, Microsoft Foundry, and signed-in Claude apps gateway sessions. {/* min-version: 2.1.207 */}In v2.1.158 through v2.1.206, auto mode was off on all of these providers except the Anthropic API and Claude Platform on AWS until you set CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_AUTO_MODE=1; v2.1.207 removed the requirement.

If Claude Code reports auto mode as unavailable, one of these requirements is unmet; this is not a transient outage. A separate message that names a model and says auto mode "cannot determine the safety" of an action means a classifier request failed; that failure is usually transient, but on Amazon Bedrock it can repeat until your account can invoke the named model. See the error reference for the causes and what to do.

If you set defaultMode: "auto" in settings and the session starts in default mode with no error, the setting is likely in .claude/settings.json or .claude/settings.local.json. Claude Code v2.1.142 and later ignore auto from those files so a repository cannot grant itself auto mode. Move it to ~/.claude/settings.json.

Auto mode on Bedrock, Agent Platform, or Foundry

On Amazon Bedrock, Google Cloud's Agent Platform, Microsoft Foundry, and signed-in Claude apps gateway sessions, auto mode appears in the Shift+Tab cycle by default. Appearing in the cycle doesn't change the mode a session starts in: sessions still start in your defaultMode, which is Manual unless you change it. Only Claude Sonnet 5, Opus 4.7 or later, and Fable 5 are supported on these providers.

To make auto mode the default starting mode, set "permissions": {"defaultMode": "auto"} in user or managed settings.

{/* min-version: 2.1.210 */}The /doctor checkup proposes this user-settings default on these providers the same way it does on the Anthropic API.

To prevent developers from using auto mode, set disableAutoMode to "disable" in managed settings. This removes auto from the Shift+Tab cycle and rejects --permission-mode auto at startup.

In v2.1.158 through v2.1.206, auto mode was off on these providers until you set CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_AUTO_MODE=1, and Claude Code ignored defaultMode: "auto" on these providers unless the variable was also set. The variable is still accepted for compatibility and has no effect from v2.1.207 onward.

What the classifier blocks by default

The classifier trusts your working directory and the remotes that were configured for it when the session started. {/* min-version: 2.1.200 */}A remote added or repointed during the session with git remote add or git remote set-url isn't trusted, and everything else is treated as external until you configure trusted infrastructure. Before v2.1.200, remotes added mid-session were also trusted.

Blocked by default:

• Downloading and executing code, like curl | bash
• Sending sensitive data to external endpoints
• Production deploys and migrations
• Mass deletion on cloud storage
• Granting IAM or repo permissions
• Modifying shared infrastructure
• Irreversibly destroying files that existed before the session
• Force push
• {/* min-version: 2.1.211 */}Committing or pushing a change that would send secrets or sensitive data outside the repository when it runs, or widen what a deploy exposes. This covers a CI workflow or deploy configuration that hands a secret to a destination that doesn't already receive it, a script or setup step that reads a secret store and sends the data out, and a config change that widens what a deploy publishes, such as a registry, visibility, artifact, or sourcemap setting. The check applies on any branch, applies even when the repository is public, and fires when the change lands, whether or not that landing triggers the pipeline; clearing it requires naming the execution effect, not only the commit or push. Before v2.1.211, this check was scoped to the default branch instead: a push there was blocked when it carried sensitive content, changes concealed or misdescribed relative to what you asked for, content ported in from outside the repository, or routed around a review you asked for, and before v2.1.203 any direct push to the default branch was blocked
• {/* min-version: 2.1.182 */}git reset --hard, git checkout -- ., git restore ., git clean -fd, git stash drop, or git stash clear, which the classifier presumes would discard uncommitted changes
• git commit --amend when the commit at HEAD was not created in this session
• {/* min-version: 2.1.198 */}From v2.1.198, git commit --amend when the commit at HEAD has already been pushed. A message-only reword is not blocked: --amend -m with nothing newly staged, on a commit that Claude created during this session
• terraform destroy, pulumi destroy, cdk destroy, or terragrunt destroy, and applying a plan that destroys resources

Claude Code v2.1.195 and later block more categories by default. Several depend on environment entries, such as sensitive remote targets and protected IaC scopes, that you can narrow to concrete names.

• Writing to a secret manager, or changing DNS records or TLS certificates
• Merging a pull request no human has approved, approving Claude's own pull request, or disabling CI checks
• Posting a comment that is itself a command to automation, such as atlantis apply or a bot's /deploy or /merge
• Toggling, ramping, or deleting a production feature flag
• Applying infrastructure changes to a protected IaC scope, or draining and removing cluster nodes
• Writes to a shared compute cluster that reach beyond the resource you named, such as a label selector or --all that catches other users' jobs
• Creating Kubernetes resources that run on every node or intercept cluster traffic, such as DaemonSets and admission webhooks
• Interactive shells or port-forwards into a sensitive remote target
• Opening a tunnel or reverse shell that makes a local service reachable from the public internet
• Printing a live credential or token into the transcript or a file
• Accessing a location listed as a sensitive data location in your environment, or copying data out of one. {/* min-version: 2.1.198 */}As of v2.1.198 this also blocks sending data from one to an audience the entry excludes
• Routing a package install around your internal package registry to a public registry. {/* min-version: 2.1.198 */}As of v2.1.198, this also applies when you've told Claude an internal registry or mirror exists in the conversation, not only when one is listed in your environment
• Running a command with a flag that disarms a safety guard, like --insecure
• Launching an autonomous agent loop that runs without human approval or a sandbox, such as one started with --dangerously-skip-permissions or --no-sandbox. {/* min-version: 2.1.198 */}As of v2.1.198 this also covers running a third-party agent or eval harness with isolation and per-action approval disabled, such as a runner started with --yes-always
• Claude in Chrome browser actions that could send page content, cookies, or credentials off-origin

Claude Code v2.1.198 and later also block these by default:

• Deleting files in /tmp, $TMPDIR, or another shared scratch or cache directory by wildcard, glob, or age filter rather than by a specific named path
• Including sensitive details in content sent, uploaded, published, or written to other people or shared systems, when your own message didn't authorize those details for that recipient. {/* min-version: 2.1.200 /}PR and issue bodies, commit messages, and comments count as this kind of outbound content when the repository is outside the trust boundary or public, including your organization's own public repositories; internal file paths, code names, live API response data such as emails or account identifiers, and infrastructure identifiers count as sensitive details. The PR, issue, and commit-message scoping requires Claude Code v2.1.200 or later. {/ min-version: 2.1.203 */}Live personal data from an API response in a PR or issue body, such as an email address, an account or organization identifier, or a usage metric, requires you to name those details and the recipient regardless of the repository's visibility or trust boundary. That check requires Claude Code v2.1.203 or later
• Sending keystrokes to Claude Code's own tmux pane to drive its own interface, which the classifier treats as Claude changing its own permissions or oversight

Claude Code v2.1.200 and later also block these by default:

• Commenting out, deleting, or force-passing a test or assertion that guards security behavior, such as auth, access control, input validation, or sandboxing
• Deleting or tearing down a stateful resource Claude didn't create in the session, when no more specific deletion rule applies and you didn't name that resource
• Repointing an API base URL, proxy endpoint, webhook receiver, or registry mirror at a third-party host that doesn't fit the task, including in example files like .env.example
• Changing where pushes go with git remote set-url or git remote add, unless you named the new remote
• Pushing secrets or personal or entrusted data to a repository known to be public, or pushing confidential material there that isn't part of that repository's own work. {/* min-version: 2.1.203 */}A dotfiles repository's own subject matter is the one exception for personal or entrusted data, and content from a private repository reaching any public surface is blocked the same way; both refinements require Claude Code v2.1.203 or later. Before v2.1.203, personal data was grouped with confidential material and blocked only when it wasn't part of that repository's own work. When a repository's visibility isn't established, the classifier doesn't block on that alone; it judges the content against the other rules instead
• Opening a pull request against a different repository or organization, forking with gh repo fork, or pushing to a third-party repository, unless you named that external target

Claude Code v2.1.203 and later also block these by default:

• Content from a sensitive local store, or from a file whose name, path, or type marks it as sensitive, entering a commit, a push, PR or issue text, a gist or paste, or a package publish, unless you named both the source and the destination. Session transcripts and conversation logs, credential and configuration dot-folders such as SSH keys, cloud credentials, browser profiles, and shell history, and user-data exports all count, and the repository being private doesn't clear it

Claude Code v2.1.205 and later also block these by default:

• Writing to Claude Code session transcripts, the .jsonl history files under ~/.claude/projects/ or your configured config directory, whether directly or through a shell command. The rule also covers the metadata lines Claude Code appends to each transcript entry for its own checks. A transcript is session state that Claude Code writes, not a working file, and a tampered entry reaches every later check once you resume the session, so auto mode blocks these writes as defense in depth. Reading a transcript isn't blocked
• A recursive forced delete such as rm -rf "$VAR" or Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $dir whose target is a shell variable, or a glob rooted at one, that isn't assigned anywhere in the conversation the classifier sees. The value came only from earlier command output, which the classifier never receives, so the classifier can't verify the deletion target against the other deletion rules. The classifier reads the conversation rather than command output by design, so it blocks the call instead of guessing at the target. The block clears when you name the exact path being deleted, or when Claude re-runs the delete with the resolved literal path written into the command. Deletes whose target the classifier can resolve aren't affected

Allowed by default:

• Local file operations in your working directory
• Installing dependencies declared in your lock files or manifests
• Reading .env and sending credentials to their matching API
• Read-only HTTP requests
• {/* min-version: 2.1.211 */}Pushing to any branch of the repository you're working in, including the default branch. A non-default branch whose name marks it as a deploy or publication target, such as production or gh-pages, isn't covered: the classifier judges a push there on its own terms. The push's content is still checked against the other rules, permissions.deny rules can still block pushes to specific branches outright in every mode, and the remote's own branch protection still applies. Before v2.1.211, only pushes to the branch you started on, branches Claude created, and routine pushes to the default branch were allowed by default, and before v2.1.203 any direct push to the default branch was blocked

Claude Code v2.1.195 and later also allow these by default:

• Deleting the exact jobs Claude created earlier in the same session
• Reading, reviewing, or writing security-related code, configs, and threat models as part of your task
• Messages between agents working together in the same multi-agent session
• Sending data to the trusted domains, buckets, and services you list in environment. This covers data flow only, not destructive or credential operations on the same infrastructure
• Claude in Chrome navigation to a trusted internal domain, localhost, or a URL you named

Sandbox network access requests are routed through the classifier rather than allowed by default. {/* min-version: 2.1.198 */}As of v2.1.198, the classifier reuses its verdict for a network host and port instead of re-running on every connection:

• An allow is reused until new content enters the conversation, at which point that host is checked again
• In the interactive CLI, a deny is dropped when the turn ends
• In non-interactive mode and Agent SDK sessions there is no turn boundary, so a deny is reused for the rest of the run
• Changing your permission mode or rules drops all cached verdicts

Run claude auto-mode defaults to print the full rule lists as JSON. If routine actions get blocked, an administrator can add trusted repos, buckets, and services via the autoMode.environment setting: see Configure auto mode.

{/* min-version: 2.1.211 */}Pushing to any branch of the repository you're working in and creating a pull request that matches your request run without a prompt, with the two exceptions the lists above cover: the classifier judges a push to a deploy-named branch such as production or gh-pages on its own terms, and still blocks a push whose content carries risk. To require a human checkpoint before these actions while staying in auto mode, add permissions.ask rules: see Common boundaries.

Boundaries you state in conversation

The classifier treats boundaries you state in the conversation as a block signal. If you tell Claude "don't push" or "wait until I review before deploying", the classifier blocks matching actions even when the default rules would allow them. A boundary stays in force until you lift it in a later message. Claude's own judgment that a condition was met does not lift it.

Boundaries are not stored as rules. The classifier re-reads them from the transcript on each check, so a boundary can be lost if context compaction removes the message that stated it. For a hard guarantee, add a deny rule instead.

When auto mode falls back

Each denied action shows a notification and appears in /permissions under the Recently denied tab, where you can press r to retry it with a manual approval.

If the classifier blocks an action 3 times in a row or 20 times total, auto mode pauses and Claude Code resumes prompting. Approving the prompted action resumes auto mode. These thresholds are not configurable. Any allowed action resets the consecutive counter, while the total counter persists for the session and resets only when its own limit triggers a fallback.

In non-interactive mode with the -p flag, repeated blocks abort the session since there is no user to prompt.

Repeated blocks usually mean the classifier is missing context about your infrastructure. Use /feedback to report false positives, or have an administrator configure trusted infrastructure.

1. Actions matching your [allow, ask, or deny rules](/docs/en/permissions#manage-permissions) resolve immediately. Writes to [protected paths](#protected-paths) route to the classifier even when an allow rule matches. Connector tools [your organization set to `ask`](/docs/en/mcp#organization-controls-on-connector-tools) and MCP tools marked [`requiresUserInteraction`](/docs/en/mcp#require-approval-for-a-specific-tool) prompt you directly even when an allow rule matches. Content-scoped ask rules fall back to a permission prompt
2. Read-only actions and file edits in your working directory are auto-approved, except writes to [protected paths](#protected-paths)
3. Everything else goes to the classifier. A connector tool [your organization set to `ask`](/docs/en/mcp#organization-controls-on-connector-tools) skips the classifier and prompts you directly, so an org-required approval is never auto-approved. {/* min-version: 2.1.199 */}As of v2.1.199, an MCP tool marked with [`_meta["anthropic/requiresUserInteraction"]`](/docs/en/mcp#require-approval-for-a-specific-tool) also skips the classifier and prompts you directly, so a consent step is never auto-approved on the tool author's behalf
4. If the classifier blocks, Claude receives the reason and tries an alternative. {/* min-version: 2.1.208 */}In most sessions the reason is the fixed text `Blocked by classifier` rather than a written explanation, in Claude Code v2.1.208 and later; see [Review denials](/docs/en/auto-mode-config#review-denials)

On entering auto mode, broad allow rules that grant arbitrary code execution are dropped:

* Blanket `Bash(*)` or `PowerShell(*)`
* Wildcarded interpreters like `Bash(python*)`
* Package-manager run commands
* `Agent` allow rules

Narrow rules like `Bash(npm test)` carry over. Dropped rules are restored when you leave auto mode.

The classifier sees user messages, tool calls, and your CLAUDE.md content. Tool results are stripped, so hostile content in a file or web page cannot manipulate it directly. A separate server-side probe scans incoming tool results and flags suspicious content before Claude reads it. For more on how these layers work together, see the [auto mode announcement](https://claude.com/blog/auto-mode) and the [engineering deep dive](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/claude-code-auto-mode).

Allow only pre-approved tools with dontAsk mode

If you set dontAsk mode, Claude Code auto-denies every tool call that would otherwise prompt you. Claude runs only actions matching your permissions.allow rules, read-only Bash commands, and calls approved by a PreToolUse hook. Use this mode for CI pipelines or restricted environments where you pre-define exactly what Claude may do; the session never waits for input. The status bar shows ⏵⏵ don't ask on while this mode is active.

Claude Code denies calls matching your explicit ask rules rather than prompting. It also denies the built-in AskUserQuestion tool and connector tools your organization set to ask, even if your allow rules match them. {/* min-version: 2.1.199 */}It denies MCP tools marked _meta["anthropic/requiresUserInteraction"] the same way, because their approval card needs an answer this mode never collects; this requires Claude Code v2.1.199 or later.

Cloud sessions on Claude Code on the web ignore defaultMode: "dontAsk"; see bypassPermissions for details.

Set it at startup with the flag:

claude --permission-mode dontAsk

Skip all checks with bypassPermissions mode

bypassPermissions mode disables permission prompts and safety checks so tool calls execute immediately, including writes to protected paths. Before v2.1.126, protected-path writes still prompted in this mode.

Explicit ask rules and connector tools your organization set to ask still force a prompt in this mode. {/* min-version: 2.1.199 */}MCP tools marked with _meta["anthropic/requiresUserInteraction"] also still prompt; this requires Claude Code v2.1.199 or later.

Removals targeting the filesystem root or home directory, such as rm -rf / and rm -rf ~, still prompt as a circuit breaker against model error. {/* min-version: 2.1.208 */}The circuit breaker also fires when the command contains command substitution with $(...) or backticks, or process substitution with <(...), whether the removal sits inside the substitution, as in echo "$(rm -rf ~)", or elsewhere in the same command. The plain form, typed as its own command, has prompted in this mode since the circuit breaker was introduced; before v2.1.208, commands containing those forms didn't prompt.

In sessions with bypass permissions available, Claude Code also doesn't enforce plan mode's blocks. Claude is still instructed to plan without editing, but a file edit or shell command it attempts during planning runs without prompting. Explicit ask rules and the removal circuit breaker above still prompt.

You can't enter bypassPermissions from a session that was started without it enabled. Enable it at launch with permissions.defaultMode: "bypassPermissions" in settings or with an enabling flag:

claude --permission-mode bypassPermissions

The --dangerously-skip-permissions flag is equivalent.

The first time you start an interactive session with this mode enabled, Claude Code shows a warning dialog asking you to accept responsibility for actions taken without permission checks. Claude Code saves your acceptance to user settings, so the dialog appears only once. If you decline, Claude Code exits. In non-interactive mode no dialog is shown, and a background session started with --bg is refused until you've accepted the dialog in an interactive session.

On Linux and macOS, Claude Code refuses to start in this mode when running as root or under sudo:

--dangerously-skip-permissions cannot be used with root/sudo privileges for security reasons

The check is skipped automatically inside a recognized sandbox. To run autonomously in a container, use the dev container configuration, which runs Claude Code as a non-root user.

Claude Code on the web does not honor defaultMode: "bypassPermissions" or "dontAsk" from your settings files, so a repository's checked-in settings cannot start a cloud session in bypass-permissions mode. The setting is ignored silently and the session starts in the mode shown in the mode dropdown instead. See Switch permission modes for which modes cloud sessions offer.

Protected paths

Writes to a small set of paths are never auto-approved, except in bypassPermissions mode and in planning sessions with bypass permissions available. This prevents accidental corruption of repository state and Claude's own configuration.

permissions.allow rules in settings files do not pre-approve protected-path writes. The safety check runs before Claude Code evaluates allow rules from settings, so an entry such as Edit(.claude/**) in ~/.claude/settings.json or .claude/settings.json does not change the per-mode outcome in the table above. In modes that prompt, the prompt for a .claude/ write offers Yes, and allow Claude to edit its own settings for this session, which approves later .claude/ writes in that session without prompting again.

Protected directories:

• .git
• .config/git
• .vscode
• .idea
• .husky
• .cargo
• .devcontainer
• .yarn
• .mvn
• .claude, except for .claude/worktrees where Claude stores its own git worktrees

Protected files:

• .gitconfig, .gitmodules
• .bashrc, .bash_profile, .bash_login, .bash_aliases, .bash_logout, .zshrc, .zprofile, .zshenv, .zlogin, .zlogout, .profile, .envrc
• .npmrc, .yarnrc, .yarnrc.yml, .pnp.cjs, .pnp.loader.mjs, .pnpmfile.cjs, bunfig.toml, .bunfig.toml
• .bazelrc, .bazelversion, .bazeliskrc
• .pre-commit-config.yaml, lefthook.yml, lefthook.yaml, .lefthook.yml, .lefthook.yaml
• gradle-wrapper.properties, maven-wrapper.properties
• .devcontainer.json
• .ripgreprc, pyrightconfig.json
• .mcp.json, .claude.json

See also

• Permissions: allow, ask, and deny rules; managed policies
• Configure auto mode: tell the classifier which infrastructure your organization trusts
• Hooks: custom permission logic via PreToolUse and PermissionRequest hooks
• Ultraplan: run plan mode in a Claude Code on the web session with browser-based review
• Security: safeguards and best practices
• Sandboxing: filesystem and network isolation for Bash commands
• Non-interactive mode: run Claude Code with the -p flag